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We demonstrate that amplification of arbitrarily weak randomness is possible using quantum
resources. We present a randomness amplification protocol that involves Bell experiments. We find
a Bell inequality which can amplify arbitrarily weak randomness and give a detailed analysis of
the protocol involving it. Our analysis includes finding a sufficient violation of Bell inequality as a
function of the initial quality of randomness. It has a very important property that for any quality
the required violation is strictly lower than possible to obtain using quantum resources. Among
other things, it means that the protocol takes a finite amount of time to amplify arbitrarily weak
randomness.
I. INTRODUCTION
The application of the laws of quantum mechanics al-
lows to perform tasks impossible in classical information
theory. The two most prominent examples are quan-
tum computation [1] and cryptography [2]. Recently, an-
other area where quantum information theory makes new
things possible has been found. It is the amplification
of weak randomness [3]. This procedure not only has
obvious practical applications, but it also sheds a light
on fundamental issues such as completeness of quantum
mechanics. However, so far the possibility of randomness
amplification has been demonstrated only under very re-
strictive conditions. To explain what they are we must
first rigorously state the problem.
We are given a source, which generates a sequence of
bits ~x = x0, x1, ... parameterized by a single constant ǫ.
The bits may be correlated with each other and also with
an agent, the eavesdropper, that holds a classical variable
e. However, there is a certain intrinsic randomness in
each of the bits quantified by ǫ in
∀i
1
2
− ǫ ≤ P (xi = 0|x0, ..., xi−1, e) ≤
1
2
+ ǫ. (1)
If (1) holds we say that the sequence ~x (or the source) is ǫ-
free. ǫ is called the bias of the source. ǫ = 0 corresponds
to the case where the output of the source is perfectly
random. When ǫ = 12 we cannot say anything about
the source and it can be even deterministic. The aim of
randomness amplification is to use some postprocessing
of the sequence ~x to generate another sequence ~y which
is ǫ′-free and ǫ′ < ǫ.
The source of randomness described above is usually
referred to as a Santha-Vazirani source after the authors
of [4], where they have proved that classical randomness
amplification is impossible. In their groundbreaking pa-
per Colbeck and Renner [3] showed that it is not true
in the quantum case. Their idea is based on perform-
ing Bell experiment and applying a hashing function to
the measurement outcomes. However, the protocol that
they have presented works only if the source of random-
ness is almost perfect to begin with. More precisely: if
the source is ǫ-free with ǫ < 0.086.
Recently, more papers on this issue appeared, aiming
at amplification of any source with ǫ < 12 . Unfortunately,
they either work only in the noiseless case[5], which is im-
possible in realistic experimental situations; require un-
bounded number of devices [6] or have a zero rate of
amplification [7, 8]. These protocols assume only no–
signaling, but for the reasons mentioned fail to perform
practically usable amplification.
Therefore, it remained an open question whether the
amplification of arbitrarily weak randomness under real-
istic circumstances was possible. In this paper we an-
swer this question affirmatively. We do so by presenting
an amplification protocol which is based on Mermin in-
equality [9]. It works for any ǫ < 12 and can tolerate
a finite amount of noise and experimental imperfections
depending on ǫ.
The aim of the paper is not to study the foundations
of the quantum theory but the details of amplifying ran-
domness in practice. Therefore, contrary to the major-
ity of papers on the subject [3, 5–8, 10], we require the
vendor of the devices to be bound by laws of quantum
mechanics instead of only no-signalling. This enables us
to develop a simple, noise tolerant protocol with only a
few, three to be precise, reusable devices1.
Recently, a protocol which is able to amplify any ran-
domness (not only from Santha-Vazirani sources) was
1 By reusable we mean devices which can be used many times in
a single run of the protocol.
2proposed [11]. While it it clearly more general than ours
it is not specified how much experimental imperfections
can be tolerated and the number of devices required for
the operation is of the order of 107 [12] which is much
more than 3 devices required by ours.
II. THE TASK OF RANDOMNESS
AMPLIFICATION
The main problem with randomness amplification lies
in our almost complete ignorance about the inner work-
ings of the source. It provides us with an infinite sequence
of bits, yet all we know about it is expressed by a single
number ǫ. For every ǫ there exists an infinite number of
ǫ-free sources and, while good randomness amplification
procedures would work well for a vast majority of them,
there will always be some that any given procedure fails
to amplify. This is the essence of Santha-Vazirani proof.
Another problem is that, since we are interested only
in the quality of the sequences, we do not have access
to any independent source of randomness. Or, in other
words, we assume that all the sources of randomness that
we have access to can be correlated and form one big
Santha-Vazirani source. Therefore, without loss of gen-
erality, any classical randomness amplification protocol
can be reduced to applying a deterministic function to
the output of the source to generate a new sequence:
~y = f(~x).
Can quantum mechanics help? After all it is a theory
built on intrinsic randomness. On the other hand, we
cannot simply use a quantum random number genera-
tor because, under our assumptions, it is also only ǫ-free.
The solution lies in Bell inequalities. They have already
been found useful in a related problem of device inde-
pendent randomness expansion [13–18]. In a nutshell,
the idea is to use the sequence ~x to choose the settings
of a Bell experiment and consider the outcomes as your
new sequence ~y. Based on these sequences the violation
of the Bell inequality is estimated, and its value tells us if
the amplification was successful or not. Let us elucidate.
A. Biased nonlocal games
One way of interpreting Bell inequalities is to think
of them as nonlocal games. Let us take CHSH [19] as
an example. If we treat it as a game then we have a
team of two players, Alice and Bob, playing against a
referee. The referee sends bits a and b to Alice and
Bob, respectively, and the players, without communica-
tion, announce their respective binary answers A and B.
They win if A ⊕ B = ab. Usually, it is assumed that
the probability distribution of the inputs is uniform, i.e.
p(a, b) = 14 . Under this condition the maximal winning
probability for the parties having only classical resources
is 34 , while entanglement allows them to reach the success
probability up to 12
(
1 + 1√
2
)
.
If we are to use ǫ-free string of bits as a source of
settings, we cannot assume that the distribution of inputs
is uniform anymore. Our game becomes a biased one,
at least from the eavesdroppers point of view, with the
success probability
Ps =
∑
a,b
p(a, b|e)P (A⊕B = ab|a, b, e), (2)
where e is a variable held by the eavesdropper. The val-
ues of Ps for classical and quantum strategies for any
distribution p(a, b|e) are greater than their counterparts
from the unbiased case. They have been found in [20].
For every Bell inequality, the larger the observed value of
Ps is the more random the local outcomes must be. One
can use the hierarchy of semi-definite programs (SDPs)
from [21] to efficiently find a lower bound on this random-
ness for any given distribution p(a, b|e). Unfortunately,
we do not know this probability distribution. We cannot
even estimate it because it may be different in each round
of the experiment and the choice of the distribution may
be correlated with variable e held by the eavesdropper.
The only thing that we know about p(a, b|e) is that both
bits a and b come from an ǫ-free source. But the impos-
sibility of the direct application of SDP is not the last of
the obstacles.
Let us assume that our ǫ-free source is always biased
towards 0, i.e. for all i P (xi = 0|x0, ..., xi−1, e) = 12 + ǫ.
Even if Alice and Bob know this and adopt their states
and measurements accordingly, there is a value of ǫ above
which quantum and classical Ps are the same. One can
use the results from [20] to find this value to be ǫcrit =
1√
2
− 12 . And if a classical model that gives certain success
probability in a nonlocal game exists, then there is also a
deterministic one achieving it [22]. Therefore, whenever
the parties have a source with ǫ above ǫcrit, whatever
success probability they observe their outcomes can be
deterministic. Fortunately, the value of ǫcrit depends on
the Bell inequality chosen for the protocol. Therefore,
our task is also to find Bell inequalities which are better
for the purposes of randomness amplification than CHSH
or the ones studied in [3].
B. Protocol: notation and assumptions
The protocol of amplification of weak randomness con-
siders two devices: the source of randomness (SoR) and
the quantum box (QB). These two devices are operated
by honest players, however they may have been manu-
factured by dishonest agents as long as they fulfill the
assumptions that we make explicit further. The task
of randomness amplification is performed in competition
with a dishonest player, the eavesdropper, having a de-
vice that generates the random variable e. The goal is to
generate a final bit y that is ǫ′-free with respect to the
eavesdropper, that is 12 − ǫ
′ ≤ P (y|e) ≤ 12 + ǫ
′.
3In the scenario that we are considering, the eavesdrop-
per, after preparing SoR and QB is quite passive. Whole
randomness amplification procedure is performed in a
shielded lab (see Fig. 3) and no information is sent out-
side. The eavesdropper does not even know at which
time the protocol is run. This means that if she has any
quantum side information (a system entangled with the
devices she has produced) she learns the same amount if
she measures her system after or before the protocol. In
fact nothing changes even if she measures it before she
gives the devices to the players. Therefore, in this sce-
nario there is no difference between eavesdroppers with
classical and quantum side information and our protocol
is secure against both.
Note, that we differ to cryptographic scenario in the
point that, after the amplification process, we do not need
to keep the generated bits secret, since we are interested
only in their indeterminacy, not privacy.
The SoR is assumed to fulfill the assumptions of a
Santha-Vazirani source, that is, the honest players can
produce an arbitrarily large number of bits ~x according
to a probability distribution that fulfills (1). The QB
receives as inputs k classical bits and produces k classi-
cal bits. The QB is reused an arbitrarily large number of
times. Let us denote by ~aj ∈ {0, 1}
k and ~Aj ∈ {0, 1}
k the
inputs and outputs of the j-th run, respectively2. Let us
also denote by ~Xj all the inputs and outputs generated
until the j-th run. The behavior of the QB in the j-th
run on a given instance of e, ~x and ~Xj−1 is determined
by the probability distribution P ( ~Aj |~aj , ~x, ~Xj−1, e). We
denote the success probability of the j-th round as
P js =
∑
~aj
P
(
F [~aj , ~Aj ] = 0
∣∣∣∣~aj , ~Xj−1, ~x, e
)
P (~aj | ~Xj−1, e, ~x),(3)
where F [~aj , ~Aj ] = 0 is the function that determines the
Bell inequality employed, cf. (2). Also, we refer to
the average success probability of N runs of the QB to
Pave :=
1
N
∑N
j=1 P
j
s .
Now we enunciate the two assumptions on the QB:
i) Markov condition: We assume that given a value of
e and the inputs ~a, the outputs probability distribu-
tion of the QB is independent of the bits generated
by SoR. That is
P ( ~A1, ..., ~AN |~a1, ...,~aN , ~x, e)
= P ( ~A1, ..., ~AN |~a1, ...,~aN , e). (4)
Note that this assumption does not imply at all
that SoR and QB are uncorrelated. It just states
that they have to be correlated only through the
2 In the particular scenario of k = 2 or k = 3 we employ for ease
of notation aj , bj , cj and Aj , Bj , Cj as inputs and outputs of the
j-th run, respectively.
random variable e possessed by the eavesdropper.
In this way, the QB is for every e a well-defined
channel applicable to the bits ~x generated by SoR.
Indeed, in our protocol the inputs ~a are generated
by the SoR, so that ~a = (x1, ..., xN ). Let us denote
by ~h the rest of the bits generated by the SoR that
are not explicitly used as inputs of QB. Then the
Markov condition (4) implies that
P ( ~A1, ..., ~AN ,~h|~a1, ...,~aN , e)
= P ( ~A1, ..., ~AN |~a1, ...,~aN , e)× P (~h|~a1, ...,~aN , e).(5)
ii) Quantum behavior: As stated in the introduc-
tion, we assume that the devices fulfill the rules
of quantum mechanics. Therefore we assume
that for all j there exist a k-partite quan-
tum state ρ(e ~Xj−1) and measurement opera-
tors M
~aj
~Aj
(e, ~Xj−1) ≡
⊗k
i=1M
aij
Ai
j
(e, ~Xj−1), with∑
Ai
j
M
aij
Ai
j
(e, ~Xj−1) = I for all i, such that
P ( ~Aj |~aj , ~X, e) = tr
(
ρ(e ~X)M
~aj
~Aj
(e, ~X)
)
(6)
C. Sketch of the protocol and proof
The protocol of randomness amplification is based on
the fact that a probability distribution with a sufficiently
large success probability for a certain Bell game can be
certified to posses some intrinsic randomness. We employ
the SoR to generate the inputs of the QB at every run.
The remaining bits generated by SoR are referred to as ~h.
The behavior of the j-th run of the QB box is character-
ized by P ( ~Aj |~aj , ~Xj−1, e) (note that it does not depend
on ~h due to the Markov assumption). In Sec. III we
show that there exists a Bell inequality such that one of
the bits produced by the QB can be shown to be ǫj-free,
with ǫj being a function of P
j
s and ǫ. More precisely
1
2
− ǫj ≤ P (A
1
j |~aj ,
~Xj−1, e) ≤
1
2
+ ǫj (7)
with ǫj = g(P
j
s , ǫ), where we have chosen the first of k
bits, A1j , generated by the QB in j-th run.
Unfortunately, the success probability P js of each run
cannot be estimated. By using the QB N times, we have
only access to one event of each run; hence we deal with
the estimated success probability Pest (the number of
runs that won the game divided by the number of runs,
N). We cannot employ standard estimation results in
nonlocality because now the distribution of measurement
settings is unknown. The standard scenario[14, 17, 18]
assumes that it is possible to use an estimator of the form
Iˆ =
1
N
N∑
j=1
∑
~A,~a
c ~A,~a
χ( ~A,~a)
P (~a)
. (8)
4This time the values of P (~a) can differ in each round in
a way that cannot be predicted without the knowledge
of internal working of SoR.
But we can bound the winning probability of a vir-
tual game: an unbiased one played with the same states
and measurements and from it obtain the bounds on the
average bias of the N bits, ǫave :=
1
N
∑N
j=1 ǫj .
Clearly, bounds on the average bias of all the bits gen-
erated does not complete the proof. One may have very
good bounds on the average bias, however some fraction
of the bits {A1j}j may not be random at all. Hence,
one cannot certify that one of them –chosen at random
employing the SoR– will posses any randomness. This
approach (of using SoR to chose some of the output bits)
was used in [3, 5, 10]. It was slightly modified in [6] where
a constant number of rounds is chosen and XOR of the
outcomes is the final value. However, if the devices are
allowed to have even tiniest imperfections, this strategy
(i.e. using SoR to pick a constant number of bits) can-
not amplify sources with ǫ ≥ 2e−14e+2 ≈ 0.345 regardless
of Bell inequality chosen and the level of imperfections.
This is shown in the appendix by providing an explicit
classical attack. In this work, we employ a more sophis-
ticated post processing based on techniques in Ref. [26]
that allows one to extract a fully random bit.
III. BELL INEQUALITIES
We are considering a protocols of a certain structure,
where the estimate of a winning probability in some non-
local game is the only parameter used to check f the am-
plification was successful. To find a candidate for a Bell
inequality to be used in randomness amplification proto-
col we first need to ask ourselves what properties are we
looking for. To this end, let us consider one particular
way of cheating3. The measurement devices prepare an
optimal classical strategy so they know in advance that
for most of the messages from the referee they will pro-
duce a good answer, but they also know that for some
they will fail. The devices also know for which inputs
they will fail. They can be tuned to the source of ran-
domness in such a way that the inputs for the case when
the devices fail are least likely to happen. We see that
the weaker the randomness the higher the average success
probability. If the randomness is very weak, the success
probability is close to 1. If we want to amplify arbitrar-
ily weak randomness, then to be certain that our device
does not play this trick, the success probability with a
quantum strategy has to be even higher. Obviously, it
cannot be greater than 1, so we have to look for nonlocal
games for which it is equal to 1.
Taking this all into account we choose the tripartite
3 By cheating we here mean violating Bell inequality with deter-
ministic outcomes.
Mermin inequality [9] as our candidate. In this scenario
Alice, Bob and Charlie each receive one input bit, a, b
and c, respectively. There is a promise that a⊕ b⊕ c = 1.
Each of them also returns a single bit denoted A,B and
C. They win if A⊕B⊕C = abc. In the unbiased version
of this game the classical success probability is 34 , and
quantum mechanics allows to reach 1.
IV. BOUNDING THE RANDOMNESS
As we mentioned before, finding lower bounds on the
quality of randomness generated by playing a biased non-
local game is highly non-trivial.
Because of the promise put on the choices of the set-
tings one can write the success probability of a nonlocal
biased game based on the tripartite Mermin inequality
as
Ps =
∑
a,b
p(a, b|e)P (A⊕B ⊕ C = ab|a, b, e) (9)
Our aim is to find an upper bound on the following quan-
tity
Pmax = max
a,b,c,X,i,e
P (X = i|a, b, c, e), (10)
as a function of ǫ and Ps under constraints∑
a,b
p(a, b|e)P (A⊕B ⊕ C = ab|a, b, e) ≥ Ps (11)
1
2
− ǫ ≤ p(a|e) ≤
1
2
+ ǫ (12)
1
2
− ǫ ≤ p(b|a, e) ≤
1
2
+ ǫ (13)
where X ∈ {A,B,C} denotes the outcome of one of the
parties. Because the conditions (11-13) are nonlinear we
cannot use semi-definite programming to solve this prob-
lem. Moreover, we are not able to construct the expres-
sion
∑
a,b p(a, b|e)P (A ⊕ B ⊕ C = ab|a, b, e) ≥ Ps, since
the values p(a, b|e) are not constant (in contrast to stan-
dard scenario with SoR without memory).
To cope with it, let us consider what would the success
probability be if an unbiased game was played using the
same states and measurements. Let us denote it by
Pubs =
1
4
∑
a,b
P (A⊕B ⊕ C = ab|a, b, e). (14)
The fact that the same states and measurements are used
for this virtual game means that the probabilities P (A⊕
B ⊕ C = ab|a, b, e) in the formula above are exactly the
same as in (11). We can use this to bound Pubs from
below. Let Pm = mina,b P (A ⊕ B ⊕ C = ab|a, b, e). We
have that
Pubs ≥ Pm. (15)
5The highest value of Ps which is still consistent with Pm
is attained if P (A ⊕ B ⊕ C = ab|a, b, e) = 1 for all a
and b except for the ones used to get Pm. Moreover the
coefficient (a, b|e) in front of Pm should be as small as
possible for something coming out of a Santha-Vazirani
source parameterized by ǫ, i.e.
(
1
2 − ǫ
)2
. This implies
Ps ≤ 1−
(
1
2
− ǫ
)2
+
(
1
2
− ǫ
)2
Pm
≤ 1−
(
1
2
− ǫ
)2 (
1− Pubs
)
(16)
or, alternatively,
Pubs ≥ 1−
1− Ps(
1
2 − ǫ
)2 (17)
Now we can bound Pmax by considering only the con-
straint
1
4
∑
a,b
P (A⊕B ⊕ C = ab|a, b, e) ≥ Pubs (18)
and using (17) to lowerbound Pubs by Ps which is a quan-
tity that we can experimentally estimate.
We find that one can obtain good bounds on Pmax al-
ready with the first intermediate level of the hierarchy
Q1+AB+AC+BC from [21]. The main result of our anal-
ysis so far is that for any4 ǫ < 12 there exists Ps < 1
such that Pmax < 1. A function g(Ps, ǫ), giving a con-
cave upper bound on P˜max, and thus on Pmax, is plotted
in Fig.1. The critical value of Pcrit(ǫ) such that for all
Ps > Pcrit(ǫ) we have g(Ps, ǫ) <
1
2 is shown in Fig.2.
4 In fact we have numerically checked only ǫ ≤ 0.499, but conjec-
ture this is true for all ǫ < 1
2
.
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Maximal bias of the measurement out-
come as a function of the weakness of randomness and success
probability of winning in a nonlocal game based on tripartite
Mermin inequality. This plot can be also understood as a
critical value of the success probability required to take in-
puts from ǫ-free source and get outcomes with bias less than
ǫ′.
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Sufficient winning probability for ran-
domness amplification in a nonlocal game based on tri-partite
Mermin inequality as a function of the sources’ freedom. If
Ps is above the plot it means that the bias of the final bit y is
lower than that of the SV source. Note that higher values of
Ps are required for extremal initial ǫ’s. This is because if ǫ is
large the initial quantity of randomness is bad which makes
the amplification difficult. On the other hand if ǫ is already
low then to amplify it we need to obtain an even more random
bit which is again difficult.
V. FULL RANDOMNESS AMPLIFICATION
PROTOCOL
If, in every round of the experiment, the device would
have the same probability of success, we could simply
take the outcomes of the experiment as our final sequence
~A and know that each of them is ǫ′-free with ǫ′ = g(Ps, ǫ).
Unfortunately, we cannot assume that, and have to apply
6some classical postprocessing. We also cannot randomly
choose a single bit from the measurements outcomes like
it was done in [3] because for such postprocessing am-
plification of randomness with ǫ > 0.345 is impossible
regardless of the Bell inequality chosen as a certificate 5.
Therefore, we need to use a different protocol but before
we present it let us clarify the task at hand.
We are given a device which is a source of randomness
guaranteed to be ǫ-free. We assume that the vendor of
the device, that may be the eavesdropper himself, has ac-
cess to some parameters e which influences its behavior.
Moreover, any other device that we have access to (e.g.
a source of entangled states) is also supplied by the same
vendor and its behavior is also dependent on e. We are
able to place the source of randomness and all the other
devices we need in a lab shielded from the environment
in such a way that it leaks no data to the outside world
during the amplification process, especially to the said
vendor. In this lab a single bit y is generated 6. We
choose some target ǫ′ < ǫ and a desired probability of
success p in generating a final bit that fulfills
1
2
− ǫ′ ≤ P (y = 0|e) ≤
1
2
+ ǫ′. (19)
To this end, we use the following amplification proto-
col:
1. Place in a shielded lab an ǫ-free Source of Random-
ness (SoR) and a Quantum Box (QB). The latter
is composed of measurement devices sharing entan-
gled state, designed for demonstrating violation of
the tripartite Mermin inequality.
2. Use SoR to draw 2N bits for the measurement set-
tings for QB for N rounds of the experiment and
make the measurements.
3. Use SoR to draw N bits representing a hashing
function. Label them h1, ..., hN .
4. Calculate y =
⊕N
i=1 hiAi where Ai is the outcome
of Alice in i-th round. Then estimate the average
Bell inequality violation Pest of QB to compute the
probability that y is ǫ′-free. If it fulfills
g (Pest − r(p,N, ǫ), ǫ) <
1
1 + 2ǫ
−
1
2
(20)
with r(p,N) =
√
− ln(1− p)N−
1
2 and g from Fig.
1; keep y, otherwise abort.
The protocol is schematically pictured in Fig.3. The
high probability mentioned in the last step is made ex-
plicit by the following theorem:
5 This claim is proved in the appendix C.
6 If we have a procedure that allows us to generate a single bit with
required ǫ′-freedom, then we can repeat the same procedure any
number of times, including the bits already obtained in e to get
a sequence of any length.
Theorem 1 For any ǫ < 12 , ǫ
′ > 0 and p < 1 there exists
N such that in the protocol presented above the bit y is ǫ′-
free with probability at least p when g(Pest, ǫ) >
1
1+2ǫ −
1
2 .
Proof. A proof is given in the appendix.
FIG. 3: Schematic diagram of the randomness amplification
protocol.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have demonstrated that amplification of arbitrar-
ily weak randomness is possible using quantum resources.
We were able to derive the necessary bounds on the vio-
lation of Bell inequalities as a function of the random-
ness’ quality. These bounds are below the maximum
achievable by quantum resources for arbitrarily weak ini-
tial randomness. We have also presented a protocol that
uses Bell inequalities for randomness amplification and
calculated all of its parameters.
We find of a particular interest the fact that the in-
equality we have demonstrated to perform well in ran-
domness amplification, does so only in quantum theory, it
cannot amplify any randomness of any quality when only
no-signalling is assumed, because the adversary, though
unable to make the whole outputs of all the parties deter-
ministic, can always fix any single bit of it [5]. Although
a different protocol based on the same inequality might
work we find it interesting that for the one presented here
the difference between quantum and no-signalling theory
is qualitative rather than quantitative. This result is in
contrast with protocols based on other Bell inequalities
where the theory of the adversary only influences the effi-
ciency of the protocol but not the possibility of its secure
execution [24].
As our paper solves an open problem it also poses some
new ones: Are there any protocols more efficient than
ours in the terms of ratio of random bits generated to
random bits used? What is the lowest violation of Bell
7inequality required for amplification of a certain ǫ-source
with three devices?
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VII. APPENDIX A: PROOF OF THEOREM 2
After performing steps 1.-4. one has N bits A1, . . . , AN generated by the QB and N bits h1, . . . , hn generated by
SoR. The rest of the bits generated in the process –such as bits for the measurement settings or the QB outputs that
are NOT employed to construct A1, ..., AN– are referred to as ~X for ease of notation. To summarize, let us recall the
three elements that will come into play in the following proof:
1. By the assumption on the behavior of the SoR, bits h1, ..., hN fulfill
1
2
− ǫ ≤ P (hi|h1, ..., hi−1) ≤
1
2
+ ǫ ∀i ≤ N
2. The observed statistics reveal an estimated success probability Pest –calculated simply as the number of rounds
when the parties won, divided by the total number of rounds N– that fulfills equation (20), i.e.
g
(
Pest −
√
− ln(1− p)N−
1
2 , ǫ
)
<
1
1 + 2ǫ
−
1
2
where p is the probability of generating successfully the final bit with bias ǫ′ (see Thm. 2 in main text).
3. The QB and the SoR fulfill the Markov assumption, so that, for any value of e
P (A1, ..., AN , h1, ..., hn| ~X, e) = P (A1, ..., AN | ~X, e)× P (h1, ..., hn| ~X, e) (21)
8The first step in the proof is to bound how much the observed average success probability Pest deviates from the
real average probability of success Pave :=
1
N
∑
j=1 P
j
s , where P
j
s is the success probability of the j-th use of the
tripartite box in the QB. Note that P js may indeed depend on the previous bits generated in the QB for the j − 1
previous runs of the QB. That is, P js should be understood as the probability of success of the j-th round conditioned
on A1, ..., Aj−1, ~X1, ..., ~Xj−1, h1, ..., hN , e.
We can follow the reasoning from [14, 17, 18] and use Azuma-Hoeffding inequality to establish that
Prob(Pave ≤ Pest − x) ≤ exp
(
−
1
2
x2N
)
. (22)
Let us define P ∗ as the success probability fulfilling g(P ∗, ǫ) = 11+2ǫ −
1
2 . Then, by (20) we have that
Pest > P
∗ +
√
− ln(1 − p)N−
1
2 .
Note that by taking x =
√
− ln(1− p)N−
1
2 , one obtains that
Prob (Pave ≤ P
∗) ≤ 1− p,
or equivalently, with probability p it is fulfilled that g(Pave, ǫ) ≤ g(P
∗, ǫ) = 11+2ǫ −
1
2 . For ease of presentation in
the following we assume that this latter condition is fulfilled. Results obtained under this assumption can be only be
certified to occur with probability p. Let us denote the bias of each of the runs of the QB by
1
2
− ǫj ≤ P (Aj |~aj, ~Xj−1, e) ≤
1
2
+ ǫj (23)
We can then use the concavity of the function g to derive
ǫave =
1
N
N∑
j=1
ǫj ≤
1
N
N∑
j=1
g(P js , ǫ) ≤ g(Pave, ǫ) <
1
1 + 2ǫ
−
1
2
. (24)
Let us note that this bound on the average bias allows one to upper bound the probability of obtaining a certain
combination of A1, ..., An. That is,
P (A1, ..., An| ~X, e) ≤
N∏
j=1
(
1
2
+ ǫj
)
≤
(
1
2
+ ǫave
)N
. (25)
Equivalently, by assumption SoR produces bits h1, . . . , hn that fulfill
P (h1, ..., hn| ~X, e) ≤
(
1
2
+ ǫ
)N
. (26)
This together with (21) will be sufficient to distill a final random bit of an arbitrarily small bias. Note that (21) implies
that conditioned on any value of ~X, e, the sources producing A’s and h’s are independent. Results on distillation of
random bits from independent imperfect random sources were first derived in Ref. [4]. Here we employ a more recent
distillation method that is best suited for our scenario.
Lemma 1 [26] Let us define a (N, b)-source one that produces N bits s1, ..., sN such that P (s1, ..., sN |k) ≤ 2
−b. Con-
sider two independent sources (N, b1) and (N, b2) producing bits s1, ..., sN and p1, ..., pN respectively. The independence
condition reads
P (s1, ..., sN , p1, ..., pN |k) = P (s1, ..., sN |k)× P (p1, ..., pN |k).
Then, the inner product y =
⊕N
i=1 si · pi is an ǫ
′-free bit –that is 12 − ǫ
′ ≤ P (y|k) ≤ 12 + ǫ
′– if
b1 + b2 ≥ N + 2 + 2 log2
1
ǫ′
.
9Previous lemma can be straightforwardly applied to our scenario. As derived above, the QB and SoR are two
independent sources when conditioned on ~X, e with bounds (25) and (26). This implies that they are (N, b1) and
(N, b2) sources with
b1 = N log2
(
1
2
+ ǫave
)−1
(27)
b2 = N log2
(
1
2
+ ǫ
)−1
Hence, the bit y =
⊕N
i=1Ai · hi is a ǫ
′-free bit ( i.e. it fulfills 12 − ǫ
′ ≤ P (y| ~X, e) ≤ 12 + ǫ
′) as long as
N log2
((
1
2
+ ǫave
)−1(
1
2
+ ǫ
)−1)
≥ N + 2 + log2
1
ǫ′
This can be achieved for any value of ǫ′ by increasing the value of N , if log2
((
1
2 + ǫave
)−1 ( 1
2 + ǫ
)−1)
> 1 or
equivalently if ǫave <
1
1+2ǫ −
1
2 , which is satisfied with probability p, as derived above.
VIII. APPENDIX B: BOUNDS ON AMPLIFICATION WITH TRIVIAL HASHING FUNCTION
As described in previous sections, our protocol for randomness amplification makes use of bits h1, . . . , hN taken
from SoR to construct a hashing function. This method distinguishes our protocol from the one in [3] where a trivial
hashing function is applied to obtain the final random bit. That is, the final random is assigned to one of the outputs
Ai where i is chosen by use of the SoR. In [5] a deterministic hashing function is applied, nonetheless their protocol
allows for amplification up to ǫ′ = 14 from arbitrarily deterministic sources by applying a trivial hashing function.
In this section we show that such trivial hashing function is useful for amplification only in the noise free case. If
the quantum resources available are not perfect, every set of measurements on each entangled state has a probability
larger than zero of not fulfilling the conditions of the nonlocal game. Hence, for large values of N , the estimated
success probability will converge to Pest = 1− κ, with κ > 0. Next, we show that for every value of κ > 0, if a trivial
hashing function is applied to the outputs A1, . . . , AN , no randomness amplification is possible for ǫ > 0.345. This
is shown by constructing an explicit attack that: (i) provides a value of κ → 0 in the limit of large N, and (ii) the
eavesdropper possess a classical variable λ perfectly correlated with the final random bit y. The attack is defined
independently of the nonlocal game or quantum states employed.
The attack is defined as follows:
• The eavesdropper has to provide N ≡ 2k nonlocal boxes. The classical variables used as inputs of the nonlocal
boxes are chosen by tossing a fair coin without any intervention by the eavesdropper.
• When the trivial hashing function is applied, k bits h1, ..., hk are provided by the SoR, whose bias is controlled
by the eavesdropper. These bits are used to choose one of the N nonlocal boxes whose output Ah1,...,hk would
be chosen to be the final bit y of the protocol. That is, each nonlocal box is labeled by a value of the string
h1, ..., hk.
• The eavesdropper chooses a string h˜1, . . . , h˜k. The bias on the SoR prepared by the eavesdropper is such that
P (hj = h˜j |h1, . . . , hj−1, hj+1, . . . , hk) = P (hj = h˜j) =
1
2
+ ǫ (28)
for every value of h1, . . . , hj−1, hj+1, . . . , hk and j. That is, each bit is independently and identically biased.
• Let us denote by Gt the group of nonlocal boxes labeled by a string h1, ..., hk that fulfills
∑k
j=1 hj ⊕ h˜j = t. As
such, t ∈ {0, . . . , k} and Gt contains
(
k
t
)
elements. Boxes in the groups Gt with t ∈ {0, . . . , ⌊(
1
2 − α)k⌋}, where
0 < α < 12 , are chosen by the eavesdropper to be classical deterministic boxes. In order to simplify further
calculations let us take the worst case scenario where the classical deterministic have null success probability in
the nonlocal game. The rest, are perfect quantum states with unit success probability in the nonlocal game.
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Given such strategy,
κ ≤
∑⌊( 1
2
−α)k⌋
t=0
(
k
t
)
2k
(29)
which tends to zero with k tending to infinity. This ensures that condition (i) above is fulfilled.
When the variables h1, . . . , hk are produced by the SoR, if a box from Gt with t ∈ {0, . . . , ⌊(
1
2 − α)k⌋} is chosen,
then, since these boxes are classical and deterministic, the eavesdropper possess a classical variable perfectly correlated
with the final bit. Let us now denote that probability of choosing one of such classical nonlocal boxes by Pattack. Note
that, according to (28), each box in a group Gt is chosen with probability
(
1
2 + ǫ
)k−t ( 1
2 − ǫ
)t
. Hence,
1− Pattack =
k∑
t=⌊( 1
2
−α)k⌋+1
(
1
2
+ ǫ
)k−t(
1
2
− ǫ
)t(
k
t
)
≤
k∑
t=⌊( 1
2
−α)k⌋+1
(
1
2
+ ǫ
)k−t (
1
2
− ǫ
)t(
ke
t
)t
(30)
≤
k∑
t=⌊( 1
2
−α)k⌋+1
(
1
2
+ ǫ
)k−t(
1
2
− ǫ
)t(
ke
(12 − α)k
)t
=
(
1
2
+ ǫ
)k k∑
t=⌊( 1
2
−α)k⌋+1
(
(12 − ǫ)e
(12 + ǫ)(
1
2 − α)
)t
.(31)
which tends to zero for N, k →∞ if
(
( 1
2
−ǫ)e
( 1
2
+ǫ)( 1
2
−α)
)
≤ 1. This is fulfilled for α→ 0 if ǫ ≥ 2e−14e+2 ≈ 0.345.
If, instead of a single round, SoR is used to choose a constant number K of them, the same condition on ǫ holds as
the probability of choosing at least one nondeterministic round is (1− Pattack)
K
which also tends to zero for N, k →∞
when ǫ ≥ 2e−14e+2 ≈ 0.345.
